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CHAPTER 1
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AN ONGOING BUSINESS
In a capitalist economy, economic activities take place in two basic ways.
Transaction between individuals or independent contractors and transactions within
a firm. ' The substitution of firm instead of independent contractors is essentially
related to the cost associated with the latter. 2 If the cost of allocation of resources
through markets is greater than the costs of allocation of resources by central
authority (which is essential for a firm or corporation) economic activity will take
place within a firm rather than across markets. 3 There are variety of costs incurred
in the allocation of resources for production of goods and services. "These costs
include costs created by uncertainty and complexity. 4 Uncertainty is inevitable in
all business relationships because it is difficult to foresee the future conditions of
the parties involved in business transactions". 5 Complexity arises when parties try
to demand how each other should respond to a particular situation. 6 If the terms of
the contracts are shorter, complexity and uncertainty do not create much costs, but
if the terms of the contracts are longer, they increase the complexity and uncertainty
'Stephen. M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and The ALl Corporate Governance Project. 61
G.W.L.Rev. 1034, 1053 (1993)
2
Id.
'Id.
"Id.
'Id.
6
Id.
2in a business transaction and hence increase costs. 7 Thus,the firm is one alternative
that can reduce uncertainties and complexities by providing a centralized decision
making body (which is the ultimate authority) which has the power to direct how
various factors of production should be utilized by a firm. 8 In other words,the firm
is a nexus or team of contracts with a centralized decision making body which
constantly rewrites the terms of the contract. 9
As said above, since a centralized decision making body is crucial for a firm or
corporation's functions and its success, it is appropriate to consider at this point,
who is appropriate to form the centralized decision making body (that is, who
should be composed of the centralized decision making body?) and what are the
functions of such body?
Traditionally, the decision making power resides in the board of directors. 10
The board of directors dominated by shareholders does not seem optimal because
most of the shareholders join the corporation with the main purpose of making
profit (profit maximization). 11 Their interests in making profit differs from one
shareholder to another. Some may prefer instant profit. Others may prefer long-
term buy and hold strategies. 12
Hence divergent interests among shareholders create disagreement on
implementing corporate strategies. 13 Further, in the modern corporate context,
7
Bainbridge, Supra note I at 1053.
'Id
"Id.
10 MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION A LEGAL
ANALYSIS. Part 3 (1976).
" RICHARD A. POSNER, KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND
SECURITIES REGULATION. 60.
12
Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 1055.
13 Id
3diffusion of ownership of stock has created a situation where shareholders do not
take much interest in a particular firm. 14 Generally, shareholders dislike risk and
hence try to hold diversified portfolios rather than concentrate in one or few
corporations. Thus, shareholders often lack the incentive to be actively involve in
running the corporation. Even if the corporation is on the verge of collapse, they
quickly sell off their stocks instead of fighting and helping to reorganize the failing
corporation. 15
A board dominated by senior executives (top managers) may be beneficial to
the corporation. In fact, seventy-five percent of the senior executives are long-term
employees of the corporation. They invest considerable time and effort in learning
their job. Much of their knowledge gained by such learning (effort and time) will
be specific to the corporation for which they work, especially when other
corporations do not do similar work or the corporation has a unique corporate
culture. Thus more they invest their time and effort in learning the job, more the
firm specific their human capital become. 16 Further, they gain easy access to
information and the decisions made by them are much more informed and can be
relied upon as their involvement with day to day operation of the business is far
greater than the others. 17 The most important aspect in appointing senior
executives is that, if there is competition among senior executives themselves, then
perhaps they are the best ones to control the board of directors. 18 However, they
will be removed from their positions by lower managers if "markets for securities
4 POSNER, SCOTT, supra note 11.
5
Bainbridge, supra note 1 at 1055
6
Id.ai 1056.
"id.
8 POSNER, SCOTT, supra note 11 at 60
4and managerial labor give poor signals as to the performance of the corporation. 19 "
The classic example for this situation is the massive changes which took place in
IBM (International Business Machines Corp), the worlds largest computer company
in 1993. The company's stock price started sliding and investors began to lose
confidence20 . This was mainly due to bad speculations by the management. The
company relied mostly on markets for "main frame computers and os/2" but
markets for such computers did not grow. Further it delayed in getting into markets
for" portable personal computers and super computers", which were growing
rapidly. 21 The company was forced to cut its work force,overhaul management,
fired inefficient executives, and finally the company hired its first outsider
chairman. 22 Further, if lower managers are also in competition for the top places in
the corporation, they may be the most informed and responsive critics of the
corporation. 23
However, the board consisting of senior executives is not perfectly faithful. 24
Generally, "senior executives have less incentive to maximize wealth as they cannot
retain all of the profits if they are successful and will not suffer all of the losses
should the venture flop". They tend to have an incentive to consume excess leisure
and perquisites. 25 In other words, they have the tendency to shirk. Thus, how can
you reduce shirking? One way to reduce shirking is to include outside directors in
19 POSNER, SCOTT, supra note 1 1 at 60.
20
Reversal offortune, Information Week, Feb 10,1993, at 28.
21 Michael Urlocker, IBM Faces Giant Task In Reinventing Itself:Many challenges facing Bigblue
As it Tries to Adapt to New World.The Financial Post,Dec 19, 1992 at SI 4.
22
supra note 20
23 PONER,SCOTT, supra note 1 1 at 60.
24
Bainbridge, supra note 1 at 1057
25
Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 Van. L.Rev. 1259 at 1262 (1982)
5the board. 26 The main task of the outside directors is to oversee and stimulate the
performance of the senior executives (management) 27 . There are advantages and
disadvantages in appointing outside directors to monitor the performance of the
senior executives.
The disadvantages in appointing outside directors in the board are that most
independent directors have "full-time employment elsewhere that commands bulk of
their attention and provides the bulk of their pecuniary and psychic income." 28
"They neither have the time nor the information necessary" to be involved in the
ordinary business of the corporation. 29 Further sometimes, the outside directors
are compelled to be under control of the insiders. For instance, if a corporation
appoints lawyers and bankers as outside directors who already provide services to
the corporation or who intent to provide services in the future such lawyers and
bankers may be reluctant to go against the corporation. 30 They tend to identify
with and support management interests and its viewpoints. Outside directors are
almost instinctively pro-management. The Board of directors of Multi Media Inc,
can be taken as an example. The company is showing signs of takeover target as it
is losing revenue. The Chairman Walter Bartlett is reluctant to make changes(to
keep the company out of possible takeover). The board which consists of nine out
side directors (five of them are part of Greenville establishment-Multi Media Inc
was formed by a merger between two Greenville media establishment, Greenville
News-Piedmont Co and South Eastern Broad Casting Corp) have the same cautious
attitude as the management. Some insiders of Multi Media Inc expressed the view
25 POSNER, SCOTT, supra note 1 1 at
27
Id.at 60.
28
Bainbridge.swpra note 1 at 1058
29
Id.
30
Id. at 1059
6that the Board's cautious attitude may be later detrimental to the corporation. 31
Even if the outside directors are not actually biased in favor of the insiders, there
will be structural bias, 32 when special litigation committees are formed to halt
shareholders derivative actions against officers or directors of the corporation. This
is because" outside directors are generally corporate officers or retirees who share
the same views and values as insiders." 33 Hence, they cultivate an attitude of not
going against their own colleagues. Further, outside directors are "nominated by
the incumbent board members and passively elected by the shareholders". This
structure biases the selection process towards directors on whose cooperation and
support the existing directors can rely.
34
However, there are certain factors which favor the inclusion of outside directors
in the board. Initially, we cannot categorize all directors as biased (actually or
structurally)"since outside directors have greater incentives to monitor management
actively and to discipline poor managers. If the company fails under their
monitorship, their reputation and future employability is likely to suffer." 35
Further, empirical evidence suggests that inclusion of outside directors in the board
minimizes shirking that outweighs the costs entailed in their use. 36
However, the board should not be composed only of outside directors. Some
scholars suggest that the inclusion of consumers, suppliers and cohabitants will be
beneficial to the corporation. Inclusion of such constituencies in the board has
disadvantages too. For instance, if ultimate consumers are allowed to represent the
31 Anita Sharpe, Sedate Multi Media Inc home of Phil & Sally Faces unclear Future, WA11. ST.J.,
May 10,1994, at Al
3:
Bainbridge, supra note 1 at 1059
33
Id.
34
Id. at 1060.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 1064.
7board, they may be less interested in the growth and continuity of the firm as their
mind is usually on the market place where they ultimately pay for the product.
There are other ways to improve consumer interests such as easy access to
information, stimulating competition and implementing laws which penalizes
producers of dangerous or fraudulent products. 37
Who should comprise of the board of directors is still a debatable question. The
American Law Institutes tentative draft No. 1, Sec. 3:03 states as follows: 38
(a) Corporate law should provide that at least a majority of the directors of
a large publicly held corporation shall be free of any significant relationship
with the corporations senior executives unless a majority of the corporations
voting securities are owned by a single person or a family group.
(b) As a matter of good corporate practice, a publicly held corporation that
is required under subdivision (a) to have a majority of directors who are
free of any significant relationships with the corporations senior executives
should have at least three such directors.
The above section reflects the present day corporate practice. The Business
Round Table statements require a "board comprising of a majority of outside
directors at least in the absence of a controlling group and the corporate directors
guide book also recommends this structure. Reliable data from variety of sources
shows that the concept embodied in Sec. 3:03 has begun to take firm hold in
practice." 39
However, it should be noted that modern corporate practice does not totally
prohibit the inclusion of senior officers of the corporation to be on the board. As
discussed earlier, the inclusion of senior executives on the board provides greater
benefits to the board and to the corporation as a whole. Hence this author suggests
37 ALFRED F. CONARD, Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 75 Mich L.Rev. 941,959
(1977).
38 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, TENTATIVE DRAFT NO.l, Part
111 71 (1982).
39 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 37 at 72.
8that a board comprised of outside directors, senior executives, and shareholders of
the corporation is ideal for the corporations functions and its success. Outside
directors will not alone guarantee successful board function. There should be a
balance of participation of constituencies discussed above. This composition will
provide high level of efficiency for the corporation as a whole. 40
Functions of the board of directors:
"Under the traditional legal model of management structure, the managing
function was vested in the board of directors" 41 . This aspect of traditional model
was embodied in a central provision of many corporate statutes. "The business and
affairs of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors". It has become
increasingly clear however, that in a typical publicly held corporation, the board
does not "manage" the corporations business in the ordinary meaning of that term.
Rather the function is vested in the senior executives. 42
The main function of the board of directors is the selection, monitoring,
removal, and replacement of the principal senior executives. 43 "Since the function
of managing the corporations business is normally performed by the senior
executives, the selection, and removal of these executives are in a sense the boards
most important function." 44 It is the obligation of the board to make sure that
"the corporation is a viable economic unit, and that the resources are being
managed with maximum efficiency". 45 " This function is usually performed not
40
Fischel, supra at 1263.
41 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,swpra note 32 at 60,61
42
Id.
43 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 32 at 63.
44
Id.
"Id.
9directly by managing the corporation but indirectly by selecting the top managers,
evaluating their performance and removing or replacing any person who does not
meet reasonable expectations."
46
By practice and law, the board elects the officers of the corporation. 47 In
electing the senior executives, the incumbent chief executive officer plays an
important role. Since generally his knowledge of the day to day operation of the
business and suitability of candidates to function as officers carries greater weight
as he has and will have much more involvement with each officers, than the
board. 48 It has been suggested by some scholars that " as a good corporate practice
the candidates for senior executive offices should be reviewed by a board consisting
of non officers of the corporation and majority of them should have no significant
relationship with senior executives."49 They consider independent review as one
of the matters of good corporate practice.
The board not only selects the officers of the corporation, but it also removes
the same. When the board finds inefficient performance by the management it has
the power to remove such officers who cause inefficiency and incompetency.
The removal function of the board has greater importance than the selection
function as it undertakes another function called monitoring the performance of
existing officers and the subsequent results produced by such performance 50 . The
proper exercise of this function depends on the independence of the board. That is
the board must be completely independent from the management of the corporation
46
Id. at 64.
47 EISENBERG, supra note 10 at 164.
48
Id. at 163.
49 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 32 at 64.
50 EISENBERG, supra note 10 at 164.
10
since their performance is the main focus of monitoring. 51 The effective function
of monitoring depends on the adequate and continuing flow of information about
corporations financial status, its day to day activities and future strategies further
the information obtained should be from sophisticated and "independent information
gathering system" and directors who are equally "sophisticated in interpreting both
financial and nonfinancial data." 52
"An important aspect of the monitoring function is to take reasonable steps to
oversee compliance with specific bodies of rules imposed by law or by standards of
the corporation such as rules on self dealing or the antitrust laws" 53 . Here the
main responsibility of the board is not to insure that violations of the law or the
standards of the corporation do not take place, but to assure that programs which
promote compliance of such rules or standard are being implemented 54 . For
instance in every publicly held corporation there should be an appropriate program
focusing on "disclosure and review of self interested transactions." 55 The other
rules and standards of the corporation that should be subject to compliance program
depends on the size of the corporation, the nature of its business and the manner in
which the business interfaces with government. 56
The second major function of the board is to review and approve major
corporate plans and policies. This function includes the formulation of "long-term
strategic plans such as mergers, acquisitions, investment budgets, annual capital and
51
Id. at !66
52
Id. at 165.
53 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 32 at 65.
54
Id. at 66
56 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 32 at 66.
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operating budgets, and targeted rates of return." 57 The board also has the power to
initiate alternative plans, to propose new plans and to disperse an existing plan.
The boards reviewing function is useful for efficient decision making as it makes
the plan initiators (mostly senior executives) to be more careful in their
. CO
preparation.
Apart from the above two major functions, there are additional functions of the
board of directors which also should be taken into consideration. One such
function is that of providing advice to senior executives or officers of the
corporation. 59 However, this function is hardly essential to the corporation's
operation. 60 The senior executives could get advice from their own staff for their
day to day operation of the business as the staff has greater knowledge, expertise,
and familiarity with the daily operation of the business. Additionally, the senior
officers could obtain outside advice from the corporation's lawyers, accountants,
and bankers rather than from the board except in situations where the board itself
consists of directors who are professionals. 61 However the board's advisory
function should not be altogether considered as unimportant. The board being part
of the corporate structure has a certain amount of familiarity with the business of
the corporation and the senior executives may sometimes be able to discuss matters
with the board which they cannot discuss with the subordinate officers. 62
57 Id at 67
58 EISENBERG, supra note 10 at 158.
59
Id. at 157
60
Id.
61
Id. at 158.
62 EISENBERG, supra note 10 at 157.
12
Functions of outside committees:
In order to support and implement monitoring functions of the board, it is
advantages to form outside committees. The outside committees can be divided
into three categories; audit, nominating and compensation committees. All three
committees should be composed exclusively of outside directors (that is directors
who have no significant relationship with the corporation). 63
The primary function of the audit committee would be to recommend the firm
to employ an independent auditor. The committee also reviews the performance of
such auditor, consults independent auditor and management, reinforces the
independence of such auditor. 64 The rationale behind forming audit committee is
"that it maintains a continuing review of the corporations financial data and
accounting controls and maintaining a continuing dialogue with those responsible
for their preparation". In theory the board itself can implement these functions
since the board is supposed to have a thorough knowledge of these functions. 65
However, "an audit committee constitutes a preferable forum for performing these
functions because reviewing and approving of financial data and accounting
control" can consume too much time of the whole board of directors. 66 Further,
such a committee strengthens the independence of the corporation's outside auditor
and thereby helps assure that the auditor will have total independence in the audit
process.
67
Finally, an audit committee creates a "forum for regular, informal and private
discussion between the independent auditor and outside directors. In the absence of
63 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 32 at 82.
64
Id. at 83
65 Id at 87.
66 Id at 88.
67 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 32 at 88.
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such a forum, the independent auditor will not have a chance to meet the board
unless a problem of great magnitude arises. 68 The formation of audit committee
encourages the independent auditor to raise potentially crucial issues in a timely
manner and allows the auditor to deal with sensitive problems in a private fashion
and gives him or her the assurance that it can" really get a hearing in the event of
disagreement with management." 69 However, to these benefits, the audit
committee should be comprised of outside directors who have sophistication and
experience in financial affairs. The number of members must vary with the
circumstances, but three is probably the minimum required in order to get the
committees work done. 70 In order to perform such functions, "the committee
should normally review on a periodic basis, the adequacy of the corporation's
accounting and financial personnel resources and should also review the effect of
any important new pronouncements of the accounting profession and other
regulatory bodies." 71
Like the audit committee, "the nominating committee serves to implement and
support the monitoring function of the board. "The monitoring function requires
objective evaluation of the performance of the senior executives and the nominating
committee helps to assure this function "partly by its screening process and partly
by providing an independent locus of responsibility for the selection and nomination
of directors and the composition of the board." 72
The primary function of nominating committee is "to recommend candidates for
all directorships to be filled by the shareholders or the boards. This function has
68
Id.
69
Id. at 88,89.
70
Id. at 95.
71
Id. at 94.
72 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 32 at 101.
14
particular importance because in the modern publicly held corporation nomination
by the board is usually equals to election." 73 Generally the board would accept
the "candidates recommended by the committee and list those candidates as its own
nominees in the corporation's proxy materials. The board does not accept all the
candidates recommended by the committee. It may reject one or two candidates
recommended by the committee" 74 .
Further, The committee may implement "procedures for identifying potential
nominees to the board." 75 It also considers candidates for the board proposed by
the chief executive officer or other senior officers or any director or
shareholders. 76 The committee may review the "functions of directors, the
adequacy of information furnished to directors, the compensation of directors,"
etc.
77
The composition of nominating committee should be of directors who are not
officers or employees of the corporation (in other words, should be outside
directors). 78 Although, officers and employees are not permitted to sit on the
nominating committee, they are not barred from "playing an active role in the
nominating process. 79 The officers of the corporation, particularly chief executive
officer can play an active role in" recommending and discussing candidates with the
committee and recruiting candidates for the board." 80 The participation of the
73
Id. at 103.
74
Id. at 103.
75
Id at 104.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 105,106.
78
Id. at 98,99
79
Id. at 102.
80 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 32 at 102.
15
chief executive in the nominating process is very vital for the selection of "high
quality individuals as directors." 81
The compensation committee, though not presently required by law, is a
common feature of most large publicly held corporations. 82 Its composition
should be solely of outside directors, since its principle purpose is to "maintain a
continuing and detail review of the various forms of compensation paid to senior
executives." 83 Especially in large publicly held corporations, the vital role that
senior executives play makes it imperative that they be adequately compensated, but
at the same time compensation of senior executives should depend on their abilities
and performance. 84
The primary function of the compensation committee is to "review and approve
the annual salary, bonus and other benefits, direct and indirect of the senior
executives. Generally, the committee would itself determine the chief executive
officers' compensation and review the proposals of the chief executive or the staff
concerning the compensation of the senior executives." 85
Further, the committee submits to the board of directors' recommendations
regarding new executive compensation programs, continuously reviews the
operation of the corporations executive compensation programs to determine
whether they are properly coordinated and "recommends changes to any executive
compensation program which yields payments and benefits that are not reasonably
81
Id. at 103.
82
Id. at 108.
83
Id. at 109,110.
84
Id. at 110
85
Id. at 111.
16
related to executive performance or otherwise operates in a manner that was not
originally contemplated." 86
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,™/*™ note 10 at 111, 112.
CHAPTER 2
THE ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS IN RELATION TO
CONTROL TRANSACTIONS
Corporate control transactions
The term corporate control has several meanings. It has been referred to by
scholars as "the group of individuals who for practical purposes may be regarded as
the control."
87
It also has been referred to as the office of the corporation, 88 an
official relation89 or more precisely a fiduciary relationship existing between the
office holder and the corporation. 90
Generally corporate control transactions are changes in corporations structure,
such as "setting up new divisions, acquiring another corporation or being acquired
by another corporation, increasing and decreasing leverage, going public or private,
selling stock or buying it back, buying or selling plants, entering or leaving
markets." 91
The primary motive underlying corporate control transactions is the desire for
growth of the corporation. However some transactions are motivated "by the desire
87DAVID C. BAYNE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF CORPORATE CONTROL- A TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 98
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 99
91 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW 109 (1982)
17
18
to reduce the number of competitors" and some are to" generate synergistic effects,
resulting from a complementarily of resources possessed by the combining
corporations as where company "A" is strong in distribution but weak in research,
while company "B" is strong in research but weak in distribution." 92
Control transactions produce gains to the corporation. 93 It has been a
successful business in the 1980s. According to the estimation of the chief
economist of the securities and exchange commission, shareholders of target firms
in successful tender offers from 1981 through 1986 received payments in excess of
$54 billion over the value of their holdings before the tender offers. 94 Further one
such gain from control transactions is that it reduces agency costs, generally
managers "do not always maximize the wealth of the investors" as they have only a
small gain in the fortunes of the firm. "Managers do not work as hard as they
would if they could claim a higher share of the proceeds. They may claim excessive
perquisites and may select inferior projects for the firm without bearing the
consequences of their actions." Hence corporate control transactions reduce agency
costs "when better managers obtain control of the firm's assets "or if alterations are
made in the incentive structure given to the existing managers. 95
Sale of controlling blocks of stock (which falls under corporate control
transaction) is also beneficial to the corporation. 96 A sale may allow the purchaser
to setup his own management team and to gain "new offers, new plans and new
working arrangements with other firms." This in turn will reduce agency costs and
92 WILLIAM L. CARY, MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS-CASES AND MATERIALS
1445 (5th edition 1980)
93 EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL, supra note 91 at 112.
94 Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley, Jeffrey M. Netter, The Market For Corporate Control ; the
Empirical evidence since 1980 2 Journal of Economic Perspectives 49. (winter 1988)
95 EASTERBROOK,FISCHEL,sw/>ra note 91 at 112.
96 Frank H. Easterbrook,Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 Yale. L. J. 698, 705
(1982).
19
create gains to the corporation.
97
Furthermore, the purchaser pays a premium over
the market price in the belief that he can "manage the assets of the firm more
profitably." The premium will be some percentage of the expected increase in the
value of the firms assets once the transfer of control becomes effective. If there
were no expected increase in the value, the buyer will not pay the premium. Hence
corporate control transactions moves assets of the firm to "higher valued uses." 98
Freeze out of minority shareholders is also beneficial to the corporation if it
facilitates a takeover. The basic characteristic of freeze out is that the elimination
of minority shareholders (that is shareholders who do not participate actively in the
management of the corporation and whose percentage interest in the corporation is
small) by majority shareholders (that is the share holders who own a controlling
block of stock of the corporation). The majority shareholders can be individuals or
a parent company. Under freeze out, minority shareholders are compelled to give
up their equity interest in the corporation. Essentially freeze out takes a form of a
merger of a corporation into its surviving parent corporation or into a shell
corporation especially formed for the purpose by those who control the merged
entity99 Furthermore, if the share prices of the target corporation increases after
the shift in control, then the purchaser will benefit by such increase. It is not only
the purchaser but the shareholders as a whole (including those who did not sell
their stocks to the purchaser) will benefit by such increase. By eliminating free-
riding shareholders in a freeze out, the purchaser may regain the costs of
acquisitions by "appropriating the gains from the transfer of control." 100 Further,
97
Id. at 716.
98
Id at 705.
99 Victor Brudney, Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freeze outs 87 Yale. L.J 1354,
1357(1978).
100
Easterbrook, Fischel, supra note 96 at 705
20
"freeze out of minority shareholders in a long standing subsidiary will produce
gains if the value of the combined entity is greater than the total value of the two
separate entities, the parent and the subsidiary." This increase in value may be due
to economies of scale, centralized management and corporate planning or
economies of information. A freeze out of minority shareholders of subsidiary is
beneficial if it reduces the cost of monitoring "conflicts of interests and enables
them to make additional cost justified investments." 101
When publicly held corporation becomes private, it is considered to be a control
transaction. This transaction produces gains. One such gain is that it
considerably reduces the "separation of ownership and control" which creates the
conflict of interest between principal and agent. 102 More over going private
transactions may eliminate costs which are inherent in public ownership. These
costs include considerable "expenditures for legal and auditing fees, stockholder
relations and compliance with mass disclosure obligations imposed by SEC and
organized stock exchanges." 103 Further, by going private a firm can avoid
disclosure obligations which can be beneficial to the firm "if it might have to
sacrifice prospective business opportunities if disclosure were required." 104
Allocating corporate opportunity to a corporate insider is also beneficial to the
corporation as it allows that "opportunity to be exploited more effectively or at a
lower cost." 105 Managers who assign opportunities to themselves can claim a
greater portion of marginal gains from their efforts and therefore they have a
greater incentive to produce such gains. The manager can compensate the firm by
101
Id. at 705, 706.
102
Id. at 706
103 EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL, supra note 96 at 706.
104
Id.
105
Id.
21
taking a lower salary and bonus and decrease in agency costs may be mutually
beneficial."
106
Fiduciary Principles and Corporate Control Transactions:
Corporate directors are said to be fiduciaries who must act in an honest way
toward the beneficiaries of fiduciary duties, that is to the corporation and to the
equity investors as a whole. 107 As mentioned in the first chapter, corporations are
complex sets of contracts, and generally "fiduciary principles are uncommon in
contractual relations." Hence how do fiduciary duties come into these contracts?
The answer is contracts cannot be written in greater detail as it is difficult to
foresee the future well enough to resolve all possible events well ahead of time. 108
It is difficult to specify all parties (who are involved in the contracts) rights and
obligations in the contract itself, especially the rights of the equity investors. The
equity investors have the protection of fiduciary principles as they "bear the
marginal risks of the firm and therefore have the best incentives to make the
optimal investment and management decisions." 109 Hence "corporate contracts
makes managers agents of the equity investors but do not mention the agents
duties." In order to make such an agency concept agreeable to the equity investors,
directors must provide "careful and honest services to the corporation as a
whole. 110
106
Id. at 707.
l01Id at 90, HENRY G. HENN, JOHN R. ALEXANDER,LAWS OF CORPORATION sec 235,
629,627 3rd edition (1983).
108
Easterbrook, Fischel, supra note 91 at 90
109 EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL, supra note 91 at 91.
110
Id. HENN, ALEXANDER supra note 110. "Corporate managerial powers are considered to be
powers in trust and hence it must be exercised honestly and in good faith".
In an agency relationship, divergence of interests is imminent. The smaller the
directors or managers share in the enterprise the more the directors interests diverge
from the equity investors." 1 There are several ways to control this divergence of
interests, one such way is the sale of corporate control. When a corporation is
under the threat of sale of its control, the managers of such corporation will
perform well in order to keep their positions intact. But this will "require
extensive and costly monitoring so that the investors and others know how well the
managers perform."" 2
However fiduciary principle is an alternative to extra and costly monitoring." 3
It replaces monitoring with precaution. Fiduciary rules (which approximate the
bargain that investors and managers would have reached if they could have
bargained at no cost) "preserve the gains resulting from the separation of
management from risk bearing while reducing the ability of managers to give
priority to their own interests over those of investors."" 4 One major function of
fiduciary obligation is to deter misconduct. It implicitly monitors the conduct of
managers, directors, and controlling shareholders." 5
Fiduciary principles imposes "anti-theft directives", restrictions on conflict of
interests and exploitation of investors wealth by the management. However there
are limitations for these restrictions which are contained in the fiduciary principles
" Easterbrook, Fischel, supra note 91 at 91.
12
Id. at 91, 92.
13
Id.
"Id.
" 5 Paul N. Cox, Reflections on Exante Compensation and Diversification of Risks as Fairness
Justifications for Limiting Fiduciary obligations of Corporate Officers, Directors, and Controlling
Shareholders. 60 Temp.L.Q 47 (1987).
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itself. Limitations which distinguishes managerial practices that harm investors and
practices that benefit managers and investors simultaneously."" 6
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of fiduciary principle is to reduce high cost of
direct monitoring of managers. " 7 This purpose again can be broadly termed as
the maximization of the welfare of the investors. In order to maximize the welfare
of the investors, the board may some times be required to distribute the wealth of
the corporation unequally. However one aspect of fiduciary duty is equal treatment
of the investors. 118 Hence there is a conflict between wealth maximization of
investors and equal treatment of investors. Does the board always stick to equal
division of wealth among the investors or can it distribute the wealth unequally, if
unequal distribution maximizes the wealth of the investors as a whole? If we
consider the investors point of view, generally they "prefer a larger pie even if not
every one may have a larger slice." 119 This is because under this fiduciary
principle their expected wealth is more and they always have the possibility of
reducing any risk by "holding diversified portfolios of investments." 12° Hence "if
a corporate control transaction produce gains, and if the gains depend on unequal
distribution, then the expected wealth of the investors as a whole is maximized by
a rule allowing unequal distribution." 121 However many investors are risk averse.
For example, they prefer a definite $50 instead of waiting for "one in ten chance of
receiving"$500. Risk averse investors may not be relevant if the market contains
1,6 EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL, supra note 91 at 91, 92.
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Id. at 110.
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Id. at 119.
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Id. Cox supra note 115 at 81. Risks of unequal division of gain from corporate control
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risk is defined as "risk that affect a given firm rather than firms generally".
121 EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL,swpra note 91 at 119
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risk neutral investors, because they can sell their risky stocks to the risk neutral
investors and invest in instruments that do not contain the possibility of unequal
gain distribution. 122 If there is a "possibility of realizing the gains by sale" of
risky shares, every investor whether he is risk averse or risk neutral will prefer
value maximizing rule. 123
As in today's financial world, most stocks are placed in mutual funds, pension
funds, insurance companies, university endowments and other financial
intermediaries which are alternative for risk neutral person, and this draws the
assumption that most investors are risk neutral. 124 Moreover when capital
markets are competitive, this competition allows investors to agree to implement
wealth maximizing objectives because "greater wealth gives them the ability to
consume or rejuggle their portfolios to give greater returns." 125
But let us not always consider only risk neutral investors are agreeable to
wealth maximizing objectives. Even risk averse investors "prefer wealth
maximizing rule for some of their investment and at the same time gain sharing
rule for others," which can be provided by contract (gain spreading devices).
However there is a limitation for this preference. Only if "contractual remedies are
cheap and if there is a self help protection" for risk averse investors, such as
diversification, risk averse investors may prefer to the wealth maximization rule
which leads to unequal distribution of gains. 126 Diversification allows risk averse
122 Id at 120.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126 EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL, supra note 91 at 121.
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investors to "invest in a portfolio containing many separate securities and to protect
themselves from the risk." 127
"Risks involved in corporate control are diversifiable." 128 Corporate control
transactions are many. "There are mergers, takeovers, freeze outs, tender offers,
going private transactions etc." 129 An investor who has a diversified portfolio
would profit from some transactions and lose from others. Investors with
diversified portfolios prefer unequal allocation of gains as long as the unequal
allocation raises the number and amount of gain transactions. 13°
Further diversification allows the gains from corporate control transactions to be
divided unequally even when investors are risk averse and markets are not
competitive. 131 The availability of diversified investment portfolios allows risk
averse investors to find protection from risky investments and risk neutral investors
to find risky stocks which may have the possibility of producing larger gains. 132
Hence "by holding a diversified portfolio containing the securities of many
corporations, every shareholder has a chance of receiving gains produced by
corporate control transactions, "not an equal chance but enough of a chance to
allow considerable diversification." 133
So far this chapter dealt with corporate control transactions, the benefits of such
transactions and the application of fiduciary duties in control transactions. Fiduciary
127 EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL, supra note 90 at 121. Cox supra note 115 at 53. According to
modern portfolio theory and capital asset pricing theory, "Investment in an efficiently diversified
portfolio will virtually eliminate unsystematic risk.
128
Id. at 122.
129
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130 Id
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Id. Cox supra note 115 at 55, "Diversification provides a means to obtaining an equal exante
chance of participating in the gains of corporate control transactions.
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duties do not always require equal division of gains from control transactions.
Unequal distribution of gains is desirable if such distribution furthers shareholders
interest. Keeping in mind that no shareholder be made worse off. Thus
shareholders generally prefer maximization of the amount of gains produced from
control transactions and not the method of distribution of such gains. 134
The second part of this chapter deals with a specific case which involves sale of
corporate control. The case stresses the view that in a sale of control the duty of
the board of directors is to obtain the best value reasonably available to the
shareholders.
QVC Network Inc v Paramount Communications Inc:
In a nutshell, the basic principle underlying the decision in Paramount case is
that the duty of a board of directors in a sale of control is to "obtain the best value
reasonably available to the stockholders." 135
In this case the Delaware supreme court held that the "directors are obliged to
seek the best value reasonably available to stock holders whenever a corporation
undertakes a transaction that will cause either a change in corporate control or a
breakup of the corporate entity." 136 The court distinguished the Paramount
Viacom merger from the Time Warner merger. In Time Warner merger, the
ownership of the combined company would have been given to "a fluid aggregation
of unaffiliated stockholders" 137 . This ownership minimizes the risk of damaging
the long term strategic interests of the corporation and depriving the former
shareholders of their continuing interest in the corporation. However, in
134 EASTERBROOK, FISCHEL, supra note 91 at 124.
135 Paramount Communication Inc. v. QVC Network /«c.,NO:427-28, 1994 WL3081, 2(Del. Supr.)
136 Meredith M. Brown, Gary W. Kubek, Paramount duties ofdirectors, 8 No 3 PH-INSIT 2, (1994)
137
Id.; Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A 2d 1150 (Del. 1990)
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Paramount-Viacom merger one man [Mr. Redstone] would become the controlling
shareholder of the combined company. When a single person becomes the
controlling shareholder of the combined company "there is a significant reduction in
the voting power of the former public shareholders of the company. The new
controlling shareholder can deprive the former public shareholders of their
continuing interest in the corporation through a cash out merger or can otherwise
alter the long term strategic vision of the prior board of directors." 138 Hence the
court held that the public shareholders should be entitle to receive "a control
premium and\or protective devices of significant value." 139 However Paramount
and its directors argued that under Revlon Inc. v MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc. case, "a duty to seek best value arises only if a company initiates an active
bidding process seeking to sell itself or in response to an unsolicited bid, abandons
its longterm strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the breakup of
the company." 140 Further, Paramount argued that it did not put the company for
sale but was simply seeking to effect a strategic alliance with Viacom that would
give the Paramount shareholders a substantial interest in the equity of the
combined company. 141 This argument was rejected by both Chancery and
Supreme courts on the ground that the breakup of the company is foreseeable if the
controlling power of the company shifts to a single person rather than a fluid
aggregation of unaffiliated stockholders.
138 Brown, Kubek, supra note 136 at 3.
139
Id..; Paramount, 1994 WL 30181 (Del.Supr.) at 7,8.
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Determination of best value available to the shareholders:
Although the court emphasized that the important role of the court was only to
"determine whether the directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision,
the court did give some guidance as to how directors should proceed in determining
which alternative provides the best value for stockholders." 142
The court expressed the view that "the board is not limited to considering only
the amount of cash involved and need not ignore totally the future value of a
strategic alliance. However, if stock or other non-cash consideration is involved,
the board should try to quantify its value, if feasible to achieve an objective
comparison of the alternatives. The board should focus on the value as of the date
it will be received by stockholders, because future actions by the new majority
shareholder could deprive minority shareholders of anticipated future growth in
value, further the court noted that such value will normally be determined with
the assistance of experts using generally accepted methods of evaluation." 143
There are other considerations which has to be assessed in considering alternative
offers such as "fairness and feasibility, financing, legality, risk of non-
consummation, bidders identity and business plans." 144
The application of business judgment rule in change of control transactions:
Under the business judgment rule, "directors are presumed to have been acted
properly and in good faith, and are accountable for their actions only when they are
shown to have engaged in self-dealing or fraud or have acted in bad faith." 145
142 Brown, Kubek, supra note 136 at 4.
143 Brown, Kubek, supra note 136 at 4; Paramount, 1994 WL 30181 (Del. Supr) at 10.
144
Id; Paramount at 10.
145 Gregory Milmoe, Troubled Directors : Fiduciary Duties ofDirectors of Troubled Companies in
the Merger&Acquisition Context,556 PLI/Comm 167,9 (1990).
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The decision in Paramount case, makes clear "that the boards actions in a
change of control transaction will be subject to enhanced scrutiny, which involves
review by the court of both the adequacy of the boards decision making process
and the reasonableness of the substantive merits of the boards actions." 146 This
test varies from the traditional business judgment rule, under the business judgment
rule, as long as the directors act with due care, in good faith and in honest belief
that they are acting in the best interest of the stockholders, the court gives great
deference to the substance of the directors decision and will not substitute its views
for those of the boards if the latter decision can be attributed to any rational
business purpose. 147
"The impact of the enhanced scrutiny triggered by a change of control
transaction also can be seen by comparing the Paramount test with the courts
language in Time Warner. " l48 In Time Warner no change of control was
involved, the court held that the directors "are not obliged to abandon a deliberately
conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly
no basis to sustain the corporate strategy." 149 Further, in Paramount case, the
court also stressed the importance of process followed by the board and held that if
the decision taken by the board is more careful, more fully informed, more
impartial, and in the case of a sale of control more open to the market testing, the
court will be less tempted to substitute its own decision to those of the
directors.
150
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In Paramount case, the court analyzed the conduct of the board of directors in
the sale of the corporation and concluded that it was not reasonable as to process
or result.
151
In order to see whether "the board was reasonable as to process the
court invoked the general principle that directors have a duty to inform themselves,
prior to making a business decision, of all material information reasonably available
to them" but emphasized that the directors must be extra careful or "especially
diligent" in negotiating a sale or change of control. 152 In analyzing the Paramount
board's conduct, the court noted the boards failure to explore "whether QVC was
likely to satisfy the financing conditions to its offer, and the lack of information
indicating that the Viacom offer was in fact superior to that of QVC." 153 Finally,
the court concluded that the directors uninformed process had deprived their
strategic vision of much of its credibility. 154
With regard to termination fee, stock option and noshop provision the court
analyzed all three provisions separately and held that the "termination fee of
reasonable proportions should be defensible, if it is appropriate to induce a bid and
does not unduly deter other bidders." 155 The court further stated that:
Termination fee agreements will be struck down if they are product of disloyal
action or a grossly negligent process on the part of the board of directors. In
this case, Paramount agreed to pay to Viacom the $100 million termination fee
if the merger agreement with Viacom were terminated due to competing
transaction or if Paramount shareholders failed to approve the Viacom
transaction. I perceive no basis to conclude that in agreeing to this fee, the
Paramount board breached any duty, including its duty to seek to achieve the
best available transaction for the shareholders. 156
151 Paramount, 1994 WL30181 at 1.
152 Brown, Kubek, supra note 136 at 5; Paramount,l994 WL30181 at 9.
153 Id at 5.
154 Paramount 1994 WL 30181 at 15.
155 Brown, Kubek, supra note 136 at 5.
156 QVC, 635 A. 2d at 1271.
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Second, "a stock option is more likely to be upheld if it is payable entirely in
cash, and if any "put" feature has a cap that [combined with the termination fee] is
reasonable in relation to the size of the transaction." 157
With regard to no shop clauses, the court held that such clauses may be
invalid and unenforceable, if they prevent the target company's directors from
carrying out their fiduciary duties in considering unsolicited bids or in negotiating
for the best value reasonably available to the stockholders. 158
The court stressed "that the bidders cannot gain vested contract rights in clauses
that are ultimately found to have violated the fiduciary duties of the target 's
directors.If such clauses violate the fiduciary duties of target directors, it will be
held invalid and unenforceable." 159
The Facts Of The Case:
"Paramount Communications Inc (herein after referred to as Paramount) is a
publicly held delaware corporation with its principal offices in New York City. It
is a global producer and distributor of entertainment with operations in motion
pictures television programming, home videos, theaters, sports and social events.
Paramount is also a leading book publisher serving consumer education and
professional information markets in the United States and Internationally." I60
157 Brown, Kubek, supra note 136 at 6.
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"In order to compete in a rapidly evolving global market place, Paramount felt
the need to increase its size and financial strength." Hence Paramount wanted to be
a major media and communications company through mergers or acquisition. As a
result Paramount' s advisors considered and evaluated the possibilities of mergers or
acquisitions of several video media companies. In 1990, there was an arrangement
of a merger between Paramount and Viacom Inc. [Delaware corp. which is also
involved in entertainment and communication business] this arrangement was made
in the belief " that such a merger would be an attractive transaction for Viacom and
the assets of Paramount and Viacom were a very good business fit." 161
During such arrangement of merger between Paramount and Viacom, QVC
Network Inc another delaware corporation having its principle office in
Pennsylvania, [which is the plaintiff in this action and herein after referred to as
QVC] showed signs of possible take over bid of Paramount but Paramount
informed QVC that it was not on sale. Paramount was solely interested in merging
with Viacom.
Later in September 1993, the original merger agreement with Viacom was
executed. The merger agreement "contained a no shop provision prohibiting
Paramount from soliciting or considering competing transactions, a termination fee
of $100 million payable if Paramount terminated the merger agreement as a result
of a competing transaction or if the shareholders failed to approve the merger or if
the board recommended a competing transaction and a lockup stock option allowing
Viacom to buy nearly 20% percent of Paramount' s stock for $69.14 per share under
QVC, 635 A. 2d at 1248.
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the same conditions as would trigger the termination fee. 162 " Apart from the
usual terms of a lockup stock option," it allowed Viacom to pay all but $1.00 per
share of the exercise price with a note of questionable marketability." 163
The effect of the merger agreement was that it shifted the voting control from
the Paramount public shareholders to Mr. Redstone [current chairman of Viacom]
by vesting an approximate 70% voting interest in the combined corporation in NAI
[National Amusement Inc] which Redstone controls. Mr Davis, who is the
chairman and CEO of Paramount would be the CEO of the merged entity.
"Further, Paramount' s shareholders would become minority shareholders in the
merged entity. The merger agreement contained no provision that would protect the
former Paramount shareholders from being eliminated from the enterprise by means
of a cash out merger." 164
Meanwhile QVC network Inc proposed an acquisition of Paramount by it at a
total package price of $80 per share of QVC shares plus $30 cash for each
Paramount share. Further QVC chairman expressed his willingness to meet
Paramount officials and discuss about a "merger that would be subject to
negotiations and stockholder approvals and regulatory clearances." 165
However, Paramount was not interested in negotiating with QVC. Paramount
stated "that the Viacom merger provides the best fit for the growth of Paramount
162
Id. at 1251.
163 Brown, Kubek, supra note 136 at 1
164 QVC, 635 A. 2d at 1252.
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business" and hence delayed discussions with QVC. Frustrated with Paramount'
s
delay QVC filed action against Paramount and "publicly announced a tender offer
for Paramount shares." 166 After QVC 's announcement of the tender offer,
Paramount and Viacom amended its original agreement, under which Viacom was
to begin a tender offer for 51% of Paramount' s shares at $80 per share, followed by
a stock for stock merger. The amended agreement did not contain any material
changes in the no-shop provision, termination fee, and lock up stock option.
However, the agreement included a "fiduciary out" provision that would enable the
board to terminate the merger agreement before a shareholder vote." 167 Further,
in response to QVC's hostile offer Viacom raised its bid. later QVC also raised its
cash tender offer to an amount more than Viacoms tender offer price. A board
meeting was held in response to QVC's higher tender offer. The board came to a
conclusion that although the QVC's price is higher than the Viacom price, the offer
was highly contingent. Therefore, the board simply rejected the QVC offer based
on the financing conditions rather than authorizing management or the board's
advisors to seek further information from QVC. 168
The main purpose of the action was to diffuse all anti takeover mechanisms
[noshop provision, lock up stock option, termination clause] and consider both QVC
offer and Viacom offer [both competing offers] fairly and on equal footing.
166 QVC, 635 A. 2d at 1254.
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The Delaware chancery court on November 24 gave judgment in favor of QVC.
The court enjoined the lockup stock option and the no shop provision. With regard
to termination fee, the court held that "it represented a fair liquidated amount to
cover Viacom's expenses and hence did not invalidate it." 169
The judgment of the court of chancery was appealed by Paramount
communications Inc. On appeal, the supreme court of Delaware affirmed the
chancery courts decision and held that the sale of control which is the outcome of
the Paramount Viacom deal implicates enhanced judicial scrutiny of the conduct of
the Paramount board and further held that the conduct of the board was not
reasonable as to process or result.
170
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CHAPTER 3
HOW SHOULD MANAGEMENT REACT TO MARKET CHANGES
Introduction to Key Corporate Functions and Their
Basic Control Mechanisms
Increasingly, shareholders are reexamining their relationship with their firms'
executives. This relationship is known as corporate governance. Its common
feature at present seems to be that managers have become insufficiently accountable
to shareholders. For example, IBM and General Motors failed to tackle looming
problems quickly enough to avoid extensive waste and compromise of their market
positions. If their management had been carefully scrutinized by the shareholders
this presumably would not have happened.
What is vital for an ideal system of corporate governance is to give the
management, especially the CEO, enough freedom to manage well and to ensure
that such management uses its freedom to manage in the interests of shareholders.
However, the management, in order to focus on the interest of shareholders, has to
take reasonable risks. Generally, corporate officers are risk averse. This is mainly
due to the fact that some risky business decisions will end up in failure and the
judicial second guessing of business decisions. When courts try to second guess
business decisions and impose liability for negligence, corporate officers will be
36
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reluctant to take risky business decisions. Some time this situation affects the
interests of the shareholders and stagnates the growth of the corporation. 171
In order to avoid or minimize such behavior by management, there should be
less interference by the courts. However, if there is ample evidence of negligence
as to a business decision, courts should be free to impose liability for such
negligence. In practice, the courts seem to minimize director liability through
reliance on the business judgment rule. Under this rule, courts will not examine the
substantive merits of the business decisions that are not accompanied by conflict of
interest, illegality and recklessness. 172
While court doctrine seems to favor managerial discretion, hostile tender offers
restrict the ability of corporate managers to pursue growth maximizing policies that
are unprofitable to shareholders. Thus, corporate restructuring by large corporations
has become a trend in order to avoid the danger of becoming a takeover target. The
managements of large firms fear that if their companies are inefficiently managed
they would soon become takeover targets. Hence, they try to down size their
corporations 173 . The classic examples of this strategy are IBM and General
Motors Corp.
This chapter focuses on how management of a company should react, when the
securities markets signal poor performance of the company. Two examples are
examined: IBM Corp and General Motors Corp. The main cause for IBM's
downfall was that the management failed to pay attention to the market. It delayed
in introducing new products to the market as rapidly as its competitors, thus loosing
share in almost all of its major markets. Consequently, the share prices of the
171 WILLIAM A. KLEIN, JOHN C.COFFEE, JR, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE,
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES, at 139 (Fourth edition 1990).
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company started sliding down and investors began to lose confidence in the
company. Ultimately, the management realized the need to overhaul its management
styles and operating methods in four of the corporation's major functions:
production, distribution, finance, and competition.This chapter considers all four
aspects by focusing on the examples in the context of basic features of the
corporate governance model.
In economics, production function is commonly termed as the relationship
between firm inputs and outputs. The production function of a company is
primarily handled by the production managers or individual officers. In most
publicly held corporations, it is a common feature to form teams to produce a
product. The team consist of persons from various departments of the corporation
such as market assessment, product planning, styling, advanced engineering and
factory operations. The team members retain their ties to their functional
departments. Further, the team is solely responsible for the success or failure of the
product. The team has a leader, whose basic function is to design and engineer a
new product and get it fully into production. The members of the team are clearly
under the control of the team leader, otherwise if a project moves from one division
to another, it will be worked on by totally different people in each department and
the project will not be successful. 174
Distribution can be considered as various routes a product takes as it travels
from manufacturer to the ultimate consumer. A channel of distribution is made up
all intermediaries that ultimately place products into the hands of the consumers.
Distribution channels typically include an independent producer that manufactures
the products, wholesalers that buy the product and distribute it to various selling
locations, i.e. agents. The agents do not take title to the products but facilitate
174 JAMES P. WOMACK, DANIEL T. JONES, DANIEL ROOS,THE MACHINE THAT
CHANGED THE WORLD, at 112,114, (1990).
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exchanges that get the products to various selling locations. The final aspect of
distribution is the retailer. The retailer offers the product for sale to the ultimate
consumer. Each member of the distribution channel seeks to maximize profit. 175
The distribution function of a company should be handled by a division which
consists of officers who have greatest knowledge in marketing. When a company
produces products which caters to different needs of the consumers, there should be
separate divisions of distribution to handle the needs of the consumers. This is
especially true for a company that produces automobiles catering to both a high
income consumer that prefers a luxurious, costly car and a lower income consumer
who prefers a handy, convenient small car. Thus, companies like GM have
distribution channels which concentrate on high income consumers and have
separate distribution channels for lower income consumers.
When considering the function of finance in a corporation, attention often
focuses on common stock and bonds or debentures as well as internal cash flows.
The finance section of a company is mainly monitored by the independent auditor
of the company. In most publicly held corporations, apart from independent auditor,
there will be an audit committee of the Board of Directors which oversees the
performance of such auditor. The audit committee is mostly comprised of outside
directors. The primary function of audit committee is to see that the independent
auditor evaluates a steady flow of the corporation's financial data and submits that
for review for the audit committee. Further, members of the audit committee should
have a financial background or understanding to provide critical assessments of
reports and make sure proper controls are in place. The finance section of the
company deals with most major investments. It undertakes projects which are
approved by the board and decides on the capital needed for such projects.
175 PAUL A. ARGENTI, THE PORTABLE MBA DESK REFERENCE AN ESSENTIAL
BUSINESS COMPANION, at 153.
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In modern days, markets for products change rapidly. This is mainly due to
increased competitors in the market. The introduction of new products to the market
is faster than before and hence the company should adopt strategies which reflect
the needs of the markets and which are least costly. The company should constantly
analyze its competitors, that is, the company has to evaluate the intents and actions
of its competitors. This is commonly termed "competitor analysis". Primarily,
competitor analysis focuses on existing capabilities and strategies of competitors.
Although this type of information is fairly easy to obtain, it is not always the most
helpful. What actually the management should do is to focus on probable future
actions of competitors such as future goals and assumptions about market trends.
However, many managers tend to feel that obtaining this type of information is
difficult but in many cases it is readily available from company's sales forces,
suppliers, distributors and sub contractors 176 . Furthermore, a company should
have a committee which consists of officers who have specialized skill in marketing
to constantly monitor the market place. The primary function of the committee
should be to focus on how fast the new products are introduced to the market and
the characteristics of such products.
When a company introduces a new project, initially the plan will be prepared by
the senior executives or the officers' management committees. Later the senior
executives submit the plan to the board for initial approval. The board considers the
project by consulting major divisions of the corporation such as production for
product design, finance for capital estimates to implement the project, and
distribution for information regarding the marketability of the new product.
However, the general trend by the board is to appoint a special committee to gain
information from the above mentioned divisions and require such committee to
176 ARGENTI supra note 174 at 104,105
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prepare an evaluation report on the pros and cons of implementing the project.
Finally, the board gives its approval based on the evaluation report prepared by the
special committee. Further, if financial or ethical conflicts arise between officers
who initiated the project and the board members evaluating implementation of the
project, it will be placed before the board on conflicts of interest to resolve the
conflict.
Thus, the four major functions of the corporation (production, finance,
distribution,competition) will be influenced by the groups of governance bodies of
the corporation such as the board of directors, officer management committees,
audit, nomination, compensation committees,and committee on conflicts of interest
in an interactive and hierarchical manner.
IBM (International Business Machines Corp): The Problems of Corporate
Culture and High Margin Product Dependence
1991 was a disastrous year for IBM Corp (herein after referred to as IBM), the
world's biggest computer manufacturer. It's sales dropped considerably and the
company booked a " 2.8 billion loss, the first in its nearly 80 year history." 177
In order to prevent further losses, the company was reorganized. The main feature
of the reorganization process was that the company was divided into " 1 3 quasi-
autonomous business units" and its work force was reduced. Nearly 40,000
employees retired from their jobs (13% of the work force). However, the
reorganization process did not produce much gain. The following year of 1992 was
worse than the previous year. The company's "books were still showing a loss of
$5.5 billion". The board was forced to cut its dividend. Moreover, the company
Reversal of Fortune, Information Week Feb 01, 1993 sec; special report; at 28.
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reorganized its management, firing inefficient executives and hiring competent
personnel and ultimately John F. Akers was removed from his chairmanship 178
This catastrophe could not be attributed to under investment because IBM
invested more than $50 billion over the past decade in research and development,
more than any other company in the world. However,the company has been
"steadily losing share and leadership in almost all of its major markets". Hence
what caused its downfall? Many former and present employees of IBM echo the
view that the company was "run into ground by its top management," a
management dominated mostly by salespersons. The management was reluctant to
change its attitude, the attitude of not grabbing the opportunities of tomorrow and
firmly sticking to a twenty year old main frame technology. This reluctance was
dominated by unhealthy reverence in its core business, the main frame business. For
instance, originally the introduction of the PC by IBM was a success. It managed to
gain leadership in the new PC market but failed to maintain its leadership. This is
mainly due to the fact that the management gave priority to the "old cash cow the
mainframe computer and subordinated the new and rapidly growing PC
business. 179 Consequently, the company failed to make any break through in
technology. Further, the company was reluctant to face the revolutionary changes
taking place in the computer industry, although most of the changes were originated
in the IBM's own laboratories. 180
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The cause for IBM's downfall can be traced far back in 1970, when System/
370 (a modified version of System/360) was introduced into the market. 181 This
happened in the midst of a recession and the product failed. It did not capture the
market as expected. IBM responded with a massive project, replacing System/370
with F/S (future system) which cost "hundreds of millions of dollars on a vast range
of hardware and software projects". 182 However when the recession ended,
System/370's sales increased considerably, making it IBM's most successful
product ever. This was a hard lesson for IBM because "almost all of the mainframe
division's designers were tied up in F/S for the first half of the decade, and a whole
370 development cycle was missed," giving a major opportunity to competitors. 183
After F/S, the management was reluctant to make any changes and this
stagnated the development of its technologies. The board withdrew into a
"coordinating role, allowing bureaucratic routine to flourish." 184 A classic
example of the management's attitude after F/S was the introduction of RISC,
Reduced Instruction Set Computing. It is a new way of conceptualizing the
interaction of computer hardware and software that radically speeds up processing.
The RISC team introduced prototype computers that were fifty times faster than the
IBM's big main frames. However, the RISC was a threat to System/370 and hence
the mainframe division did not show any interest in adopting it. Later, after IBM
had entered the personal computer market, the RISC team introduced PC
181 /^.System/360 was introduced by Thomas J. Watson Jr,son of the founding father of IBM
corp.System/360 is more like a memory storage system which can be used to solve almost any
commercial computing problems.
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microprocessors, which were "ten times quicker than the processors IBM was
using." This product was also not adopted because of the cautious attitude of the
top management. 185 Presumably, the decision to proceed with the RISC project
was undertaken by senior executives who were in charge of the research and
development division and subsequently placed before the board for approval.
Objections must have been raised at the board meeting regarding the
implementation of the project, since the ultimate decision not to proceed with the
project would have to have been taken by the full board.
However, the company could not totally ignore the RISC's capabilities. In the
early 1980's the company "launched two major RISC development projects, one
project was for a mini computer family (Fort Knox) and the other project for a
desk top workstation called "Olympiad." 186 These projects did not get the favor
and support from the other divisions, especially the mainframe and the PC
divisions. "The divisions that did choose to proceed with the projects were
immediately subjected to coordinative salvos from every side." 187 The two RISC
projects did not last long. The company spent more than $100 million in
implementing the two projects and lost every thing.
Although the creator of RISC did not favor its adoption, other "researchers
began to discover its virtues". 188 Many companies including Sun Micro Systems,
Mips Computer, Hewlett-Packard, Silicon Graphics and Digital Equipment began
to market RISC based computers which were very fast and inexpensive. Markets for
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these computers increased rapidly which finally led IBM to launch a new
competitive RISC product, the RS/6000 work station. 189 The above situation
reflects the attitude of the whole management structure. By refusing to face up to
new technological changes which were happening in the computer industry, the
company missed the opportunity to dominate "one of the critical computer
technologies of the 1990V" 90
The introduction of IBM PC, in 1981, was a success. 191 It captured half the
market, the sales were skyrocketing and the entire operation was so smooth. The
profits earned by PC sales in 1984 was $4 billion. 192 However this success did
not last long. In years following 1984, the company started to lose control over PC
standards. Its share of the PC market shrank considerably and the "company lost
money on every machine it sold." 193 The primary motive behind entering the PC
market was that to take firm control over the main frame business. Thus the board
must have felt that if the company fails to enter the PC market, it may not be able
to survive in the mainframe business. The management dominated mostly by senior
executives initiated the PC project and the board presumably approved the project
by appointing a special committee to evaluate the successfulness of the PC
business.
The primary blunder with IBM PC production was the selection of outside
suppliers for standard components. The selection itself was not a blunder but having
selected outside suppliers, the company never made an attempt to take firm control
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
id.
m
ld.
193
Id.
46
over them. 194 Most importantly "Intel" which supplied microprocessors and the
"Microsoft" which supplied DOS software "were left free to supply IBM-Standard
components to an entire industry of IBM PC clone makers", which regularly under
cut IBM on price and finally beat IBM on quality, method, and speed of product
cycle.
195 IBM's own attempt to develop microprocessor was a flop.
Consequently in 1986, the risk of losing control of the microprocessor standard
became imminent as Compaq, another PC producer, beat IBM to market with a "PC
based on the Intel 386 chip, which set the standard for business computing for the
next five years."
196 The same year IBM entered into a major technology sharing
agreement with Intel. Under the agreement, IBM had the right to make, and to sell
intel designs in return for important IBM chip making technology. However, this
attempt also failed to produce much revenue due to bureaucratic inertia. 197
The relationship between IBM and Microsoft lead to similarly unfortunate
events. Microsoft constantly "outfought and outthought" IBM to the point where it
became its most dangerous competitor. 198 The decision to collaborate with
Microsoft would have been a tougher decision for the full board. There must have
been objections raised for such collaboration(especially from the technical
community) because Microsoft was always interested in furthering its own business
. However, it appears that the board had ignored in views of some of its own
members (that is the view of not to collaborate with Microsoft).
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By 1983, IBM developed an internal DOS alternative, called CP/86 which
was later upgraded to CP/286 and then to CP/386 or CP/X86 for" subsequent
generations of Intel chips." CP/X86 was compact, efficient code that could run
DOS programs, but included many functions that DOS did not have. One such
function is that it could run two separate programs in different windows
simultaneously. Another project called Mermaid, allowed users to run programs by
clicking at pictures rather than typing instructions altogether. This program
equalled the potentials of Microsoft's Windows 3.0, which was later introduced in
1990. Further, CP/X86 was portable since it was written in an IBM software
language which could run on any processor, at least in theory. "DOS was written to
run exclusively on Intel processors". '"
With all the virtues of CP/X86, the IBM's top management decided to choose
a system called OS/2 with the collaboration of Microsoft and to scrap CP/X86. This
decision created turmoil in the IBM technical community and reflected the reality
that Microsoft was gaining control over IBM's PC business. Some commentators
suggest that IBM, instead of collaborating with Microsoft, "could easily have
collaborated with one of Microsoft's eager competitors, Lotus or Borland to help
develop and market the new system." 200
The development of OS/2 was also a rough road. It took more than three years
to develop the system due to countless IBM bureaucratic interventions. The worst
part of development was the decision to write OS/2 almost entirely in 286
"assembly language." A software language tied specifically to the internal layout of
the 286. A 286 assembler program is a "complicated code, hard to write, hard to
199
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test, always limited to Intel chips, and because of its strong ties to the 286 standard,
had performance inferior to the 286's much superior successors". 201
After the introduction of OS/2, the relations between IBM and Microsoft were
so strained that a breakup was inevitable. Microsoft, solely interested in furthering
its business, diligently worked on windows as a direct competitor to OS/2. Upon
dissolution of their relationship IBM was left with a useless system (OS/2 written in
286 assembler). It took nearly five years at a cost of $1 billion to get OS/2 free
from the 286 assembler. In early 1992, IBM released a new product OS/2 2.0,
which gained some modest commercial success but not a match for Microsoft's
windows.
Thus IBM created the PC industry but failed to gain control over it. It had
been reduced to a commodity manufacturer, alienated from the most profitable
segments of the PC industry.
The Need For Restructuring:
In order to regain its dominant position in computer industry, IBM felt the
need to restructure the whole setup. This restructuring process began several years
ago but at a slow pace. When John F. Akers was replaced by Louis V. Gerstner
Jr., the latter felt that the restructuring process had to be accelerated.
The primary focus of the new chairman was to accelerate the company's cost
cutting process by shrinking the workforce as well as eliminating under utilized
buildings and nonstrategic assets. 202 In 1993, nearly 47,000 workers left IBM and
the company intends to reduce more. Eleven thousand employees will leave their
201 Reversal offortune, supra note 168 at 28.
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49
jobs when the sale of IBM's Federal System Co (which develops complex
computing system for uncle Sam.) to Loral Corp is completed. 203
However, the primary step towards restructuring was to "divide the company's
product groups to reflect the market's shift to client/server computing, that is using
powerful "servers" to feed data and programming to desktop "clients" such as
personal computers". 204 The company grouped mainframes, minicomputers and
high end work stations and other related software into a single server group.
While IBM Personal Computer Co was created to handle the clients. This division
of responsibility was designed to enhance the marketing of client /server systems by
specializing sales forces and distribution channels. 205 The decision to divide
responsibilities would have been mainly influenced by the functions of distribution
and competition. The company ignored a fast growing market, the PC market which
is low cost and easy to handle. Presumably in order to revert its attention to PC
market, the company divided the responsibilities and formed a separate division to
handle the PC business.
The new management of the later group is eager to actively involve the
company in consumer markets associated with the "emergence of the so called
information superhighway, where the biggest growth opportunities will be in
equipping consumers with hardware and services for the digital deluge". 206 Mr.
Richard Thoman, its chief executive, is the first executive from outside the industry
to manage an IBM product business. The appointment of Mr.Thoman as the new
chief of IBM's personal computer company was management's boldest effort to
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dismantle IBM's entrenched culture,which is very reluctant to make changes and
especially reluctant to introduce outsiders to manage their business. Further, the
new management is intensely focusing on capturing the consumer market and hence
the appointment of Mr.Thoman is a positive step towards success. 207
IBM's mainframe business is showing a slight decline. The company's
"mainframe revenues were 12% lower in the first quarter of 1994 compared with
the same period a year earlier". 208 The decline in mainframe market is partly due
to the introduction of personal computers. Many companies found it convenient to
use smaller computers at a lower cost. Hence in order to stabilize its market for
mainframes the company introduced a new mainframe system, the new "mainframes
are powered by anywhere from two to 192 microprocessors linked together". The
new technology not only reduces "the physical size of the computer", it also makes
it easier for users to manipulate the "power and capacity". 209 However, IBM still
leads in the mainframe market. It "out sells its closest competitors by at least five
to one in the mainframe market." 210
More over, IBM is trying to establish "RISC architecture as an alternative to
Intel Corp's microprocessors." It intends to introduce new personal computers
based on the Power PC chips that it is developing with Apple and Motorola Inc.
However, the company may have a problem of convincing important business
customers that the future prospects for this kind of PCs are far greater than the
conventional PCs. 211
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In the middle of 1994, IBM, as a part of its restructuring process, introduced a
new plan which considerably changes its "marketing and sales structure". 212 The
main focus of the plan is to organize the company's primary sales people by
industry instead of geography. The new structure enables the company's account
executives to report directly to the industry group heads instead of top branch
managers. This is one way of reducing massive layers of bureaucracy. 213
The company set up a board sub-committee to primarily handle matters of
corporate governance. The main goal of this sub-committee is to improve relations
with shareholders. Further, the sub-committee has some duties of a traditional
nominating committee; that is nominating new directors, considering shareholder
recommendations for new members, reviewing board size and composition,
supervising the company's position on public responsibility issues, and considering
outside director pay and retirement policies214 .
However the toughest and most critical task lies in reshaping IBM's "heart and
soul"; its "entrenched patriarchal culture". 215 The new management realizes the
difficulties in dismantling seven decades of culture. Nearly 40% of IBM top
managers are reluctant to accept the need for change. They fail to realize the
urgency for change. The new chairman insists that the company should primarily
focus on the market place, not "employee policies and basic beliefs". 216
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General Motors Corp: The Problems of Multi-Layered, Multi-Division
Management:
The debacle of General Motors Corp has some similarities to the debacle of
IBM. The main similarity is that both companies failed to introduce new products
to the rapidly changing market place. The failure of General Motors Corp is
mainly due to cash shortage, but the failure of IBM is mainly due to "management
culture that is not attuned to speed".
217
General Motors Corp's share of the U.S car market has been on the decline for
a long time. Until 1991, the board of directors failed to realize the company's
poor performance. It was in late 1991, the board gradually "came to terms with
some hard realities". 218 The company lost $7 billion that year. Its share of the
car market declined to 34 percent. 219 The board demanded rapid changes in the
management structure but it was ignored by the top management, especially by the
former chairman Bob Stempel. Dispirited by the consistent apathy of management
to make changes, the board acted on its own. On April 6th 1992, the board
appointed Jack Smith as the President and "entrusted him with fixing one of the
most intransigent companies in America". Bob Stempel was forced to resign in
October 1992 and he was replaced by John Smale and President Jack Smith added
the title of Chief Executive Officer. 220 The new management accelerated the
restructuring process which began under former Chairman Stempel. It mainly
focused on dismantling the "kind of organizational complexities that have frozen the
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company in the past". 221 The first step towards restructuring was to reorganize
General Motors "clutter of operating divisions and to create a unified North
American Operations Structure". Cadillac, Chevrolet, Oldsmobile, Pontiac and
Buick still function as marketing organizations but production, design and
purchasing are all under one umbrella". 222 Further, it created a "single North
American Strategy Board" to handle policy decisions and "abolished a tangle of
executive committees." The main purpose of creating such a board was to speed up
policy decisions. Earlier policy decisions had to pass through various committees,
which took weeks or even months. After the creation of Strategy Board, the
decisions get approval within two or three days. 223
The company's product development needed an urgent overhaul. The company
has used platform teams which consist of members from engineering, design,
finance, purchasing and marketing, for the production of cars etc. for nearly a
decade. 224 However, its approach was impeded by bureaucracy. The team
members were still beholden to their respective fields. For instance, the
engineering member was answerable to the engineering colossus and purchasing
member was answerable to the verticle purchasing structure. Further, teams often
had to coordinate designs among its many marketing divisions and various team
members had "rigid areas of control and the right to overrule other members on key
issues". That led to frequent changes that complicated the designs and added
manufacturing costs. 225 The decision to form teams initially would have been
prepared by senior executives or the officers of the production division and placed
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before the board for approval. However without providing greater freedom to teams
to handle a project independently, the project would not have provided much gain.
The new management created a single purchasing office to replace twenty
seven separate purchasing divisions. That finally realized the "leverage of GM's
enormous purchasing clout". The management was able to shave $4 billion from
the company's annual materials bill by demanding "double digit price cuts from
suppliers" and eliminating high cost contracts. This created enormous animosity
and distrust among the suppliers. 226
The introduction of low cost parts was not always favorable. It created
problems. For instance, at the company's Arlington plant, a part (an ill fitting
ashtray) supplied by a new Sub - par supplier caused a "six weeks shut down of
Buick Roadmaster production". The problem with low cost parts was that half of
them failed quality tests. Hence the company had to buy parts from other suppliers
with high cost. 227 Further, in 1993 the company missed its third quarter
production target by 95,000 vehicles because of widespread problems in its
factories". That delayed the delivery of urgently needed 1994 models and
decreased GM's share of the U.S car market to 29 percent in September 1993. 228
The management, in order to reduce costs, began eliminating workforce. In
1992 the company reduced corporate staff from 13,500 to about 2,500 but it has to
reduce more as it still has excess staff. 229 Moreover, as part of the cost cutting
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process, the management has begun to sell its non strategic assets. It has listed
noncore business totaling 3 billion in annual sales.
230
The whole idea behind General Motors Corp's restructuring process is to make
the company a "leaner, quicker manufacturer." 231 Under this leaner system, the
company will not have the "buffers of extra inventory and plant capacity to
compensate for mistakes." The managers must be clever enough to cope with the
harder leaner system, that is they will have to weigh risks and respond quickly
when problems arise. 232 In order to achieve this goal, the managers must
"develop a clear sense of purpose which is absent in large sectors of the
company" 233 . Presumably, a special committee (which was formed to monitor the
market) would have played a major role in introducing the leaner system. The board
before giving approval should have required information from production and
distribution divisions to see the feasibility of introducing such a system.
However, the company is showing signs of recovery. This is partly due to the
price increase on Japanese cars and also working in the company's favor is the shift
of consumer tastes from Japanese models to American models. The shift is partly
due to the improved quality of American models. The U.S car and truck market is
growing again, "buoyed by economic recovery and improved consumer confidence".
The company is also helped by cost cutting and the introduction of cars such as
Saturn and Cadillacs (which have high performing engine systems) that are better in
quality and style. 234
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The Need for Changes in the Relationship Between The Board of Directors and
Corporate Officers.
The study of IBM and General Motors Corp reflect the situation that in order
to compete in a rapidly evolving market place, the companies must radically
restructure their manufacturing methods and management styles. For instance,
General Motors Corp realized that in order to compete with other auto makers, such
as Chrysler Corp, Ford Co and in particular the Japanese, it has to abandon its mass
production techniques and copy the Japanese system of lean production. That is
using less resources (inventory, labor, factory space and investment) and creating
team work. 235 Speed is also an important element, because the market is always
full of competitors. "If you are not faster than your competitor, you are in a tenuous
position, and if you're only half as fast, you're terminal" said George Stalk, a
manufacturing expert. 236 However the core problem lies in changing the attitude
of the bureaucracy, in making it realize the need for change and the urgency for
change.
Further, when a company depends on high margin products (for example IBM's
mainframe computers) while the market shifts to low margin products (such as
work stations) it will affect the growth of the company. More precisely the
company may lose its market share. This is mainly due to the fact that market for
securities declines as the markets for its product decreases.
As mentioned before, the introduction of new products to the market is now
faster than before and hence the company must adopt strategies which reflect the
needs of the market. That is the policy makers of the company, primarily the board
of directors and senior managers must cope with the market by introducing new
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products as rapidly as its competitors. This can be achieved by using sophisticated
technology. Further, the management should initiate programs and processes to
alter production and distribution to suit the preferences and pockets of the
consumers. The management when initiating programs should consider the
challenges of its competitors. Monitoring the market and its competitors is essential
for the success of the company. Hence the management, especially by appointing
special committees should focus on the how competitors function in the market and
see whether competitors are undercutting or not.
When a company forms alliances with outside suppliers, there should be
sufficient provisions in the contract regarding the quality of the product it is
intending to purchase. Further, there should be provisions in the contract
preventing the company's technology from being robbed or leaking out. In the case
of non-performance or inadequate performance by the supplier, the purchaser
should have the right to terminate the contract or withhold payment. Further
alliancing with competitors (such as IBM and Microsoft) lead naturally to
opportunistic temptation. The trust and good faith collaboration expected of each
party is subject to abuse if one party behaves selfishly. This can be avoided or
reduced by making provisions in the contract for reciprocal penalties. That is if one
party does any damages to the other party, the damage will be done to that party
too. Hence the interaction of the management of a company, especially the board
of directors and board committees should focus on the market change, the
competitors, product innovation, and deficiencies in forming alliances with outside
suppliers.
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
A "corporation" is a team of contracts with a centralized decision making body
which constantly rewrites the terms of the contract. The composition of the
centralized decision making body is vital for a corporation's functions and its
success. A multi constituency board is ideal for a corporation. For instance, a
board consisting of stockholders, senior executives and outside directors seems
optimal because these constituencies have greater incentive to achieve a high level
of efficiency for the corporation as a whole. If a board consists purely of
stockholders, it will not be beneficial because generally shareholders dislike risk
and hence they try to hold diversified portfolios rather than concentrate on one or
few corporations. Thus, shareholders lack the incentive to be actively involve in
managing the corporation. Moreover, divergence of interests among shareholders
(for example, some may prefer instant profits and others may prefer longterm
benefits), may create disagreement in implementing corporate strategies.
Unrestricted salability of stocks also allows stockholders to escape from corporate
policies with which they disagree.
However, inclusion of top Managers or senior executives on the board provides
gains to the corporation because they gain easy access to information and hence
their decisions are more informed and can be relied upon as their involvement with
daily operations of the business is far greater than the others. If there is
competition among top managers themselves, then they are the best ones to
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dominate the board of directors. However, senior executives may not be faithful,
after gaining control of the board. They may tend to expropriate the wealth of the
security holders rather than compete with each other. They may have the tendency
to shirk and this shirking can be constrained best by outside directors. Outside
directors have the incentive to monitor the management efficiently and to discipline
poor managers because if the company performs poorly under their monitorship,
their reputations and future employability are impaired, not to mention increased
liability from shareholder and creditor suits.
The most important function of the board of directors is to monitor the
performance of the top managers. Effective monitoring depends on an adequate
and continuing flow of information about the corporation's financial status, its daily
operations and future strategies. The information obtained should be from
sophisticated and independent information gathering systems and directors who are
equally sophisticated in interpreting both financial and non-financial data.
Further, in order to support the monitoring function of the board, it is
advantageous to form outside committees. These committees can effectively
implement the monitoring function. It is a common practice in publicly held
corporations to form audit, nominating, and compensation committees in order to
effectively implement the Board's monitoring functions. These committees
primarily consist of outside directors. However, this author suggests that if the
board consists of several constituencies such as stockholders, insiders (senior
managers) and outside directors, the formation of outside committees may not be
necessary and thus it reduces monitoring costs. What is vital is that in a
competitive environment, monitoring mechanisms which are lower in costs are
likely to survive.
Corporations are not static. They are in motion. The constant feature of a
corporation is change. Corporations change their physical structure, they setup new
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divisions, acquire another corporation or are being acquired by another corporation,
and they enter or leave markets. These changes are commonly termed as corporate
control transactions. The board of directors plays a critical role in corporate control
transactions. Directors are said to be fiduciaries to the equity investors and
fiduciary principles require directors to maximize the wealth of the investors. This
principle may lead to unequal wealth distribution. Although equal distribution of
wealth is one aspect of fiduciary duty, the directors may distribute the wealth
unequally, if unequal distribution maximizes the wealth of the investors as a whole.
Generally shareholders prefer a rule that maximizes the total amount of gains
produced from control transactions and not the method of distribution of such gains.
In a sale of control, where new control becomes inevitable, the primary duty of
the board of directors is to seek the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders. There are a series of cases that stress this proposition. The basis
underlying all these cases is that, in the case of sale of a company, the board of
directors has a duty in maximizing immediate shareholder value and if there are
several bidders, the board has an obligation to auction the company fairly.
When markets for securities show poor signals as to the performance of the
corporation in their respective product or service markets, radical changes in the
manufacturing methods and management styles become inevitable. To recapture
strength in their markets, the companies seek to restructure their management styles
and manufacturing methods. The whole idea behind the restructuring process is to
reduce costs and to introduce leaner, quicker manufacturing system. This type of
system was introduced by the Japanese. The success of Japan in consumer
electronics and automobile markets is mainly due to the leaner manufacturing
system, which requires less of everything including inventory, labor,investments etc.
Under such lean systems, risks have to be weighed beforehand and problems have
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to be solved quickly. Production managers will not have extra resources to
compensate for mistakes. Thus the system must minimize mistakes and reduce
costs. Team work is also an essential element in this system. A team consists of
members from varying departments of the company such as engineering, design,
finance, purchasing and marketing. The team is directly responsible for the success
or failure of the product. Moreover, in order to compete with other competitors,the
companies must speedup their production. This can be achieved by using less
inventory, simple designs, computer technology and less interference from the
bureaucracy. For instance, General Electric Co, in order to compete with other
competitors especially Germany's Seimen AG, completely restructured its
production of circuit breaker boxes. It consolidated the circuit breaker's unit at one
plant and simplified the boxes' design by reducing its total parts to 1,275 from
28,000. It installed a computerized system that streamlined the production of
boxes. Further, the company eliminated a layer of middle managers and entrusted
production workers with those middle management responsibilities. The results of
this restructuring was that the production of circuit breaker boxes increased while
manufacturing costs decreased. 237
In the past, introduction of new products to the market was slower because
manufacturers strove for steadiness. "Every new production was an enormous
venture."
238 However, it will be different in the future. The markets will change
constantly, the introduction of new products will be faster than ever because of the
breakthrough in technology. The management has to adopt strategies that reflect
the needs of the market. For instance, one reason for General Motor Corp's failure
237Timothy D. Schelhardt, Carol Hymowitz, The Second Century: U.S. Manufacturers Gird For
Competition WALL ST. J. May 2 1989.
™/d.
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was that it believed that the customers should adapt their needs to the cars it was
building, rather than company producing cars which reflect the needs of the
customers. 239
Thus, what is vital for a corporation is to have a board of directors comprising
of members who have portfolio of sills, backgrounds, personalities that best fits the
needs of the corporation. The board members should possess the skills to ask right
questions at the right time. "A true measure of board, effectiveness must be
outcome oriented." 240 The basic question a board must constantly evaluate is that
the corporation make a timely shift in strategy according to the market shifts? Or
was the board surprised by developments? The board must take into consideration
the opinions of members, intuition, logic and common sense to sort through and
evaluate the various practices that finally lead to a more effective board. As a good
corporate practice, the board must evaluate its effectiveness periodically. 241
239MARYANN KELLER, COLLISION at 248 (1993).
240 TRobert A. Bassett, Corporate Law, Now that the Spotlight is focused upon board effectiveness,
directors are wise to conduct comprehensive self-evaluations and consider adopting new procedures.
THE NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, December 12, 1994 at B4, B7.
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